New: Posteo public key directory

Created on 04. December 2015, 15:30 | Category: Info

Dear Posteo users and interested parties,

It is our desire to make the exchange of public keys for end-to-end encryption easier and more secure. Today we have taken a first step to this end: You can now publish your public PGP or S/MIME key in our new Posteo key directory and thereby also securely in the DNS, the internet’s so-called telephone book. In the coming weeks we will be progressively activating further options for the new Posteo key directory.

Background:
For a while now, various players in the area of internet security have been working on making the exchange of keys for end-to-end encryption easier and more secure. Public keys are to be securely stored and made available in the DNS. To this end, new, free standards will soon be adopted. For a long time, behind the scenes, we have worked on simplifying the key exchange process in multiple steps, to occur in line with the new standards. So far, the standards remain in draft format, but we consider them advanced enough that we have begun to use them.
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The technical designation for the upload of PGP keys was determined some months ago. Over the last few months we engaged ourselves in the responsible working group, such that the DNS parameters for S/MIME keys also be determined by IANA, which is responsible for administration of the DNS in the internet. For us, S/MIME is an equally worthy and just as important encryption standard.

On Tuesday, the organisation also determined the technical designation for lodging S/MIME keys in the DNS.

Your public S/MIME or PGP key used to encrypt emails can therefore now be securely added by us to the DNS. There, others can find your key and use it to encrypt emails to you. Your key is stored in the key directory secure against falsification with standards OPENPGPKEY and SMIMEA, which are soon to arrive. This process corresponds to DANE technology: DANE secures TLS server certificates in the DNS, while OPENPGPKEY and SMIMEA secure (against falsification) public keys used for email communication, in the DNS. Keys for end-to-end encryption that are published in the DNS are also secured with DNSSEC, as for DANE.

Through the use of security technologies such as NSEC3, we also prevent the mass-collection of email addresses and keys from the DNS: A key can only be retrieved for a specific email address known to the person searching. This actively prevents the misuse of the DNS as a source of email addresses for spammers.

OPENPGPKEY and SMIMEA are to constitute an alternative to previously widespread key servers, which exhibit multiple problems:
Until now, anyone can upload your public key to worldwide key servers, even if you personally do not want this. In addition, anyone can upload a falsified key for you. Keys that are uploaded there can no longer be deleted. This results in multiple as well as outdated or incorrect keys for an email address being found in key searches on the worldwide key servers. On the key servers, a multitude of valid email addresses are saved, and can be found by spammers who request email addresses from key servers on a mass scale in order to send spam to these addresses. Anonymity is also affected by the key servers: With OpenPGP, anyone can see who has declared their “trust”, similar to a social network. Thus social connections can be openly viewed for each person. The new process at Posteo is implemented without exhibiting any of these weaknesses.

The Posteo key directory is found in the settings of your Posteo account, under “PGP and S/MIME encryption”.

Before uploading your key to the Posteo key directory, please check whether it conforms to the Posteo guidelines. To protect your privacy, you can only upload a key that contains your Posteo email address or one of your aliases, among other things.

The new OPENPGPKEY technology is already implemented in the standard software GnuPG, and Verisign is working on an SMIMEA plugin for Thunderbird. We hope that the dissemination of OPENPGPKEY and SMIMEA proceeds quickly, so that the exchange of public keys becomes easier and more secure.

Best regards,

The Posteo team

Migration service now includes address book

Created on 16. November 2015, 18:00 | Category: Info

Dear Posteo users and interested parties,

Moving to Posteo just became even easier. With the Posteo migration service, you can now transfer more than just your existing email accounts (including folder structures) to Posteo at the click of a button.

From now on, the migration service also transfers your previous address book from most large providers to Posteo. You can conveniently transfer your contacts to Posteo without requiring any special technical knowledge.
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Because we do not use any third-party solutions at Posteo for the transfer of your personal data, we have developed individual solutions for the secure transfer of your data from each of the providers listed. In particular, your contacts’ sensitive data (e.g. name, address and phone numbers) are not transferred via a third party at any point. The data is collected by Posteo directly from your previous provider and transferred to your Posteo address book via an encrypted connection.

Posteo address book migration is available for the following providers:

AOL
Gmail
GMX
iCloud
Microsoft services such as Outlook.com, Hotmail, Office 365
Yahoo!
WEB.DE

The migration service is found in the settings of your Posteo account under “My account”.

You can decide yourself whether you would like to permanently delete your email and address book data from your previous provider.

The Posteo migration service is free of charge. It was developed in line with our principle of maximum data economy. Thus, for example, we do not save the email address from which you have transferred data to Posteo.

Tip: After migration you can individually encrypt all data you have saved with Posteo. Available for this purpose are Posteo’s address book and calendar encryption and Posteo crypto mail storage (for your email data). For both features you do not require any special technical knowledge; the encryption occurs at the click of a button. These encryption features are found in the settings of your account under “Encryption”.

Best regards,

The Posteo team

Posteo company portrait in c't magazine

Created on 05. November 2015, 12:00 | Category: Press

Posteo is one of the more unusual German startups: The email provider foregoes advertising and wants to collect as little data from its users as possible. This regularly leads to unreasonable conflicts with authorities. Posteo’s breakthrough came in 2013 via the Snowden revelations. More or less overnight, the company became known in nerd circles as an email provider that does not merely pay lip service to privacy and security. Germany’s Der Spiegel and FAZ as well as The Guardian celebrated Posteo as a poster child for secure communication.

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Posteo testing certificate pinning

Created on 16. October 2015, 12:00 | Category: Press

Email provider Posteo is one of the first German online service providers to use a brand new concept to make encryption on the web more secure.

Certificate pinning is a relatively young standard that has come in to restore trust in encryption on the web. A very simple intervention for the server itself can prevent most cases of certificate misuse. Posteo becomes the first larger German service to test this concept in practice.

Certificate Pinning
The security of a TLS connection is based on the fact that you are actually connected to the correct partner. So-called certification authorities (CAs) guarantee this, by checking the identity of a service provider, certifying it with their digital signature. The problem is that there are too many CAs, and the list of those that have abused this trust is long. Recently, Symantec, Verisign, Thawte and RapidSSL were found to have issued certificates to Google domains for test purposes and without authorisation. With certificate pinning, a server operator can determine which certificates a browser should accept for its domain in future. It works with Chrome, Firefox and Opera, but Internet Explorer, Edge and Safari have not yet implemented the internet standard for public key pinning extension for HTTP (RFC 7469). On the server side, the implementation of pinning is not yet widely in use. Some large services such as Google, Facebook and Twitter use it, but don’t use pins anchored in the browser. Internet services that use dynamic HTTP public key pinning (HPKP) are currently still hard to find. Posteo is one of the first German providers to implement it in its current practice. Checking the header delivered by the server reveals the entry, Public-Key-Pins: pin-sha256=“HuTEMYw…”, which nails down the Posteo certificate. More on how certificate pinning functions, how to set it up yourself and things to note can be found in the “SSL wird sicherer” article (in German) in the current issue of c’t.

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Transparency report: German authorities mess up

Created on 25. August 2015, 17:00 | Category: Blog

Dear Posteo users,

We would like you to know how often authorities request user information from Posteo. We have therefore today published our transparency report for the year 2014. In the report, we lay out how often German investigative authorities approached us in 2014 – and how often Posteo actually had to release data. The report covers all requests from authorities that Posteo received in the year 2014. Posteo operates more than 100,000 paid email accounts. In 2014, we received 22 requests from authorities. In Germany, there is no such thing as secret requests that are not allowed to be mentioned. You will also find out how often these requests were formally correct and how many of the requests were illegal. #more#

Because almost all requests from authorities that reached Posteo until now were illegal, we devote emphasis to the information process in our report this year. We critique the chaotic circumstances that rule, in particular in requests for user information under § 113 TKG (German telecommunications law). We reveal that grave deficiencies exist in practice, there are regularly breaches of the law and the deficiencies in controls of the situation are becoming even worse. Germany might be known for its exactness, but German authorities have failed miserably at abiding by the legal requirements. Posteo has not yet received any requests from foreign authorities.

To document our critique of the information and surveillance processes, we have today published numerous examples of illegal requests from authorities on our website. In addition, we present our exchanges of correspondence with public positions such as the state privacy officers, the privacy officers of the respective German federal states as well as the respective ministries of justice of the German federal states.

Thus you will obtain an insight into our privacy-oriented work that takes place at Posteo all year round. In addition, we occupy ourselves in the report with the control instrument of the judicial reservation, which is in our view no longer equitable in respect of its intended purpose: in practice, clearly all applications for surveillance in Germany were granted. Although statistics are not even kept to determine the effectiveness of the judicial reservation, we have found numbers that prove this.

The German government meanwhile remains idle, even though it has been informed of some of the grievances for many years and continues to be questioned, as we show in the first part of our report. We demonstrate this with a reply from the Federal Ministry of the Interior that was published last Wednesday (19th August), among other things.

The complete transparency report can now be found on the Posteo website.

We call on Justice Minister Heiko Maas to stop the draft law for the reintroduction of data retention. If the possibilities for surveillance in Germany continue to be enlarged while the deficiencies shown in our transparency report still exist and clearly every application for surveillance is approved, this would be a development that can not be beneficial to democracy.

Note: The German government’s draft law for the planned reintroduction of data retention (“Gesetz zur Einführung einer Speicherpflicht und einer Höchstspeicherfrist für Verkehrsdaten”) currently stipulates that the entire area of email should be exempt from retention. This means that Posteo does not belong to the group of obligated parties. We assume, however, that the introduction of the law would further increase the number of illegal requests for user information made to us.

If you would like to support our work, we would be very pleased if you would circulate our transparency report and the information contained within it, as well as making enquiries with the parties responsible. Last May, Posteo became the first German telecommunications provider to publish a transparency report. With our move, we induced other German providers to in the meantime also publish transparency reports – including, among others, Deutsche Telekom. With our transparency report this year, we would like to contribute to making existing grievances and legal realities public and allowing them to be debated. We want change: the grievances must be eliminated and democratic control of state information processes in Germany must be strengthened.

Best regards,

The Posteo team